What Do We Know?
Why do we believe that drills and exercises work for disaster training? In many disciplines, drills have been beneficial. Drills are conducted for a multitude of reasons, including: enhancing personal and team capabilities, identifying areas of need of improvement, and validating existing plans.
The main reason that most disaster and preparedness drills are performed is because they show the public and most importantly, funding agencies that there is a "commitment" to preparedness. Additionally, for many healthcare systems, drills satisfy the regulatory requirements that provide necessary funding. 1 So why are the majority of drills and deployments discussed in the literature unsuccessful? Participants and evaluators perform disaster and preparedness drill expecting failure, in order to learn from what went wrong/right.
Most plans, including the ones used to construct the evaluation tool described in this report, are an "illusion" because they are neither based on valid assumptions about human behavior, nor incorporate normal patterns of the organization. 2 What was interesting in this paper was that at some time after the drill, the evaluators were able to have a discussion with the fire service incident commanders who when confronted with their short-comings in adherence to the protocols, felt that in a real situation they would have done things differently and would adhere to the plans as written. However, countless case reports have shown this to not be the case; incident commanders/firefighters will not follow the outlined plan, as they have not drilled it to memory. To their credit, the authors do discuss that guidelines are incongruent with what people are most likely to do, and that exercises can be the information that the substance was a "white-powder" biological substance with an asymptomatic exposed population, then observe their response to this particular scenario. In the next drill, a similar scenario is presented but the incident commander is not informed about the white powder being biological. If the response by the incident commander is to treat the white powder as a chemical agent rather than a biological agent, then perhaps expectations and protocols must be reevaluated to reflect that assumption.
How to Walk Away with Success
Lenz and Richter described the shortcomings of their tool, observers, and subjects, but shied away from what would really make a difference to the drill community: drills should be based on reality and response plans rewritten and based on what people are likely to do, rather than what they should do. 6 To this a more innovative paper, they should have recommended how to take what they learned to make a more helpful evaluation tool. In addition, they could have described how they were able to take what they learned in this drill and were able to rewrite their protocols so that the next drill was successful. Their next paper should be a case report of firefighters responding to a biological drill and how well they responded based on the recommendations.
used to predict if the use of such guidelines will be efficient in an actual incident. 3 A firefighter colleague once stated, "We work like we train and train like we work".
In the discussion section, the authors mention that the firefighters did not recognize the biological threat and treated the incident as a chemical threat. Why did this happen? Why would it not have happened? The evaluators and plan writers expected that the firefighters would react with a heightened awareness to the presence to a powder and presume that it was a biological agent. In actuality, the firefighters did what they should have done. As studies report, people often perceive low-probability events to have zero likelihood and would not be taken seriously in a drill scenario. 4 In this case, a bio-event is low probability for a firefighter who normally trains, drills, and responds to chemical spills, car crashes, and buildings burning and/or collapsing. Response personnel are trained to react and not always to think abstractly. When describing the South Canyon wildfire disaster, Usseem, Cook, and Sutton noted that when leaders decided to inform and empower their work team, performance was more effective. 5 With this in mind, a different way to have conducted the drill and test the protocols, might have been to give to the incident commander
